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Abstract ‘‘Ethics’’ is used as a label for a new kind of
expertise in the ﬁeld of science and technology. At the
same time, it is not clear what ethical expertise consists in
and what its political status in modern democracies can be.
Starting from the ‘‘participatory turn’’ in recent social
research and policy, we will argue that bioethical reasoning
has to include public views of and attitudes towards bio-
medicine. We will sketch the outlines of a bioethical
conception of ‘‘public understanding of ethics,’’ addressing
three different issues: (a) the methodological relevance of
moral questions and problems raised by lay persons in
everyday life regarding biomedicine and technology,
(b) the normative relevance of such lay moralities for the
justiﬁcation of ethical decisions, and (c) the necessity of
public deliberation in this context. Finally, we draw con-
clusions in view of the concepts and methods such a con-
ception of ‘‘public understanding of ethics’’ should employ.
Keywords Ethics expertise  Public understanding
of science  Lay moralities  Qualitative social research 
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Introduction: ethics as a public policy affair
Alongside the established academic discipline and its the-
oretical discourse on moral philosophy, ‘‘ethics’’ has
emerged as a label for a relatively new kind of public
actors and procedures in the ﬁeld of science and technology
during the last decades (Nowotny et al. 2001). This ‘‘ethics
industry’’ (Lancet 1997), as it has been called ironically,
comprises a complex and intransparent scenery of new
speciﬁc experts, new institutions (boards, committees) and
new regulations or at least normative agendas (guidelines,
soft laws), in various social contexts and on different
political levels.
In 2001, for example, George W. Bush established the
President’s Council on Bioethics and endowed it with
authorities and resources in order to ‘‘advise the President
on bioethical issues that may emerge as a consequence of
advances in biomedical science and technology’’ (Presi-
dent’s Council on Bioethics 2001). And in the same year,
the European Commission declared in its Science and
Society Action Plan that ethics is an integral part of the EU
research policy and recommended ‘‘the fostering of net-
works of ethical committees at both national and local
levels’’ as well as ‘‘the development of an international
dialogue on ethical principles through conferences and
workshops’’ (EC 2002).
In these contexts, ‘‘ethics’’ does not simply refer to a
scholarly way of moral philosophical reasoning and
teaching, but extends to a whole ﬁeld of social roles and
practical functions which are not necessarily occupied by
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decision making processes on different political levels and
in various areas of professional practice. In this sense, it is
described as governance ‘solution’, an instrument for the
regulation of new social and technological trends (Now-
otny et al. 2001; Jasanoff 2003; Fox et al. 2008).
This development raises a series of important questions.
From a global socio-historical point of view, the meaning
of the phenomenon itself is discussed: How far can the
evolutionary boom of a rapidly proliferating ‘‘ethics
industry’’ be regarded as symptomatic of recent social
trends, e.g. of a crisis of accustomed forms of government,
or governance, in an increasingly complex scientiﬁc civi-
lization (Beck 1992) or of the high reﬂexivity of late
modern, post-traditional and pluralistic societies (Giddens
1991)? Furthermore, it is examined how ‘‘ethics’’ functions
as a social practice or power play (e.g. Haimes 2002; Fox
et al. 2008), a disciplining and normalizing mechanism
(e.g. Frank and Jones 2003), a novel type of ideology (e.g.
Koch 2006), or just a way of assuring the interests of an
academic profession—as insinuated in the pointed slogan
that ‘‘medicine saved the life of ethics’’ (Toulmin 1982).
More recently, various social scientists also criticise the
progressive ‘‘ethicization’’, mainly referring to two argu-
ments: First, there is the concern that (soft) ethics replaces
(hard) politics and law, and therefore science and tech-
nology will develop without any clear and deﬁnite limits
(Bogner and Menz 2005). Secondly, it is assumed that if
‘ethics’ is only conceptualized as western, analytical ‘arm-
chair’ philosophy, it is insensitive to cultural differences or
even part of a problematic colonization (Fox et al. 2008).
We do not share this line of argument in general, but we
think that it is indeed necessary to reﬂect on this phe-
nomenon, especially with an ethical eye. After all, ethicists
and ethics institutions interfere with public and political
dimensions in manifold ways. They give advice to gov-
ernments, make ‘expert’ statements for parliaments and
formulate recommendations for many ﬁelds of practice. At
the same time, however, it is not clear whether ethics
expertise exists, at all, what it consists in, and how its
increasing political inﬂuence can be justiﬁed. How can
ethical expertise be understood, modiﬁed and expanded in
order to strengthen the current trend—a trend that seems
reasonable and desirable to many ethicists?
In recent social research and policy, critical debates
about (social scientiﬁc) expertise and the interrelation of
science and society have led to an increasing inclusion of
public views and experiences. In this article, we will argue
that there are good methodological and normative reasons
for bioethics to take an analogical way by including public
views of and attitudes towards biomedicine. This is in line
with the recent trend of including empirical studies more
directly into bioethical reasoning. Our study is part of an
ongoing research project in which the ‘‘public under-
standing of ethics’’ is investigated on an empirical
(Schicktanz et al. 2008; Schweda and Schicktanz 2009) and
on a conceptual level (Schicktanz 2009; Schweda and
Schicktanz 2010; Wynne 2006). Based on our earlier work,
this paper elaborates this line of thought much further with
regard to the critical assessment of ‘expertise’, the dialec-
tics between social science and ethics in the ﬁeld of
empirical ethics and the particular relevance of discussing
the inclusion/exclusion of public/patient perspectives.
We ﬁrst give a brief introduction to the recent discussion
around ‘ethical expertise’, appraising the concept’s value
and critically assessing some of its perplexities. Under the
slogan ‘‘ethics of public understanding’’, we then use the
evolutionoftheparticipatoryparadigminmorerecentsocial
studies of sciences and medicine as a starting point and
explicate its normative motives and underpinnings. In anal-
ogy to this development, we then sketch the outlines of a
corresponding bioethical conception of ‘‘public under-
standing of ethics’’ in the next section, addressing three
different issues: (a) the methodological relevance of moral
questionsandproblemsraisedbylaypersonsineverydaylife
situations in the context of biomedicine and modern tech-
nology,(b)thenormativerelevanceofsuchlaymoralitiesfor
the justiﬁcation of ethical decisions, and (c) the necessity of
public deliberation in this context. Finally, we draw con-
clusions for the concepts and methods such a conception of
‘‘public understanding of ethics’’ should employ.
Expertise in science, ethics and morality revisited
The list of ethics experts and ethics committees is expand-
ing, especially in medicine (e.g. Schicktanz 2008). They are
appointed or implemented on local, regional, national or
even international levels. Their legitimization follows an
expertocratic pattern as it is common in many contexts of
contemporary policy making (Reck 2003): Their political
inﬂuence is not justiﬁed with reference to democratic pro-
cedures such as majority votes, but with expertise.
Generally speaking, expertise is understood as some
superior and/or exclusive form of knowledge and compe-
tence in a particular ﬁeld which can be acquired through
training and experience (Ericsson et al. 2006). In this sense,
it is usually supposed that trained scientists examine causal,
functional or statistic relations in nature and society with
technically sophisticated equipment and laborious proce-
dures, accumulating—it is supposed—solid knowledge
about facts and probabilities. Of course, this concept of
scientiﬁc knowledge—related with truth and objectivity—
is highly disputable, e.g. starting from Popper’s critical
rationalism or from social constructivism. Nevertheless, as
modern societies are characterised by uncertainty and risk,
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indispensable. Thus, scientists are given licence to tell us
how the world ‘is’ (and hereby often implicitly how the
world ‘should be’) because they are supposed to know
best—or, at least: better.
The idea and necessity of policy advice by speciﬁc
experts is rather widespread and in general uncontroversial.
However, the application of the expertocratic model to the
ﬁeld of ethics causes serious difﬁculties and perplexities
(for an overview, see Steinkamp et al. 2008; Rasmussen
2005). In contrast to more traditional notions of scientiﬁc
expertise, it is less obvious what ethics expertise consists in
or what its basis and its quality standards are. After all,
ethics is not primarily concerned with facts, but with values
and norms. It is questioned whether the term ‘knowledge’
applies here (Scoﬁeld 1993). The fact that the ‘‘battle of
experts’’ is fought particularly ﬁercely and intransigently in
this ﬁeld supports the idea that ethics merely relies on
subjective views, relativistic argumentations, and feelings
(Cowley 2005). Furthermore, the notion of ethical exper-
tise contravenes modern egalitarian sensibilities—one of
the leading paradigms of modern ethics, itself (Lagerspetz
2008; Scoﬁeld 2008): As almost everybody has some set of
moral values and principles, it is not clear how anyone can
claim universal expertise in this area. Does this claim
imply that some peoples’ values or principles are ‘‘supe-
rior’’ to those of others? And if so: For what reasons? What
speciﬁc kind of knowledge or competence do ethics experts
have (Birnbacher 2002)? And what political role and
inﬂuence should they play (Delkeskamp-Hayes 2005)?
In order to answer these questions, a ﬁrst crucial dis-
tinction has to be made between ethics expertise and moral
expertise. It presupposes the distinction of morality as a set
of rules and values actually guiding individual life and
social interaction—and ethics as its normative reﬂection,
justiﬁcation or critique in view of validity, desirability and
legitimacy. In this sense, ethics expertise as a theoretical
competence involving particular methods of reﬂection and
justiﬁcation is distinguished from moral expertise as a
speciﬁc moral sensitivity and authority not necessarily
resting on explicit theoretical reﬂection, but rather on
education, practice and experience (Du ¨well 2000).
Insofar as this distinction presupposes the expert-lay-
divide, it needs at least some clariﬁcation: On the one hand,
public moral positions and arguments almost always seem
to entail some sort of ethical reasoning. At least in view of
modern pluralistic societies—in the ‘reﬂective age’—it is
hard to defend that people blindly follow some set of
intuitions or rules. Instead, in everyday life we observe
that—at least occasionally—we are reﬂecting on moral
intuitions or rules, are arguing about them and trying to
justify them with reference to higher order principles. In
this respect, the strict distinction between morality and
ethics can be called into question. There is no clear
demarcation line between lay moralities and ethical (aca-
demic) reﬂection, but rather a continuous interactive
spectrum: both involve normative reasoning and discus-
sion, albeit to a different extent and on different levels of
theoretical sophistication.
This also holds true in the converse perspective: Nor-
mative ethical reasoning obviously does not ﬂoat in a social
vacuum. It is performed by concrete persons with their own
moral convictions and situated in socio-cultural contexts
which often involve speciﬁc social roles and moral rules.
Even if ethical reasoning aims at an ‘‘ultimate justiﬁcation’’
or a radical critique of particular norms, it usually has to
start from some set of consensual moral convictions on
what is important, right, just. In applied ethics, this con-
nection has been theoretically captured in the justiﬁcatory
model of a ‘‘reﬂective equilibrium’’ between theoretical
reasoning, ethical principles and concrete moral judge-
ments (Daniels 2003).
In the academic discourse, different approaches to ethics
expertise have been formulated:
a) ethics expertise basically consists in a profound
familiarity with ethical theories, models and arguments
and their application to particular situations (Singer
1979);
b) ethics expertise includes some form of moral wisdom
(Nobel 1982), or
c) ethics expertise is identiﬁed with the ability to justify
one’s moral judgements in a coherent way (Yoder
1998).
However, the reliance on and trust in ethical expertise
depends on the (meta-)ethical approach (or philosophical
school) one belongs to: Only partisans of rationalism and
cognitivism share the idea that strong justiﬁcation allows
the (rational) assessment of good and bad arguments. Here,
the relevant criteria for ‘expertise’ are rationalism and
argumentation. Partisans of more relativistic, theological or
pragmatic ethics approaches might see wisdom and expe-
rience as relevant criteria. Thus, we have to bear in mind
that even within the ethics community itself, there is neither
consensus on the ultimate criteria nor the certainty that all
ethics expertise can fulﬁl these criteria. Therefore, we want
to point out the general need of a self-critical discussion of
the idea of ethics expertise in ethical debates. This does not
imply a plea for the abolition of ethics in public debates.
The ‘‘participatory turn’’ and the ethics of public
understanding of science
In a similar crisis of the concept of expertise, social sci-
ences and policy research discussed the implications of
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science and medicine. One consequence of this process was
the discovery and inclusion of the public, its perspectives,
attitudes and experiences, not only as an object, but as a
subject of research (Lengwiler 2008), and as an agent of
policy also beyond parliamentary representation. This ini-
tiated a ‘‘participatory turn’’ (Jasanoff 2003) that was based
on shifts in theory and methodology. This turn indicates a
fruitful route for other disciplines, too, including ethical
reﬂection and bioethics as a form of policy advice.
The history of social studies of science can be roughly
described as a three stage development: From the rather
expertocratic approach of measuring and increasing ‘‘sci-
ence literacy’’ among a passive public audience, over the
paradigm of ‘‘public understanding of science’’ (Abbr.
PUS) with its focus on public attitudes to the participatory
idea of actively engaging the public (Bauer et al. 2007).
The shift from one paradigm to the next was induced by
crises and normative concerns. After brieﬂy sketching
these paradigm shifts, we want to explicate their underlying
normative motives in order to gain orientation for the
debate on ethics expertise.
When social research on the uptake of science among
the general public started in the late 1960s, its primary
concern was of an educational nature: The general public
should be informed about scientiﬁc methods and knowl-
edge so that they were enabled to act as competent citizens
in a science based society (e.g. Bybee et al. 1980). The
underlying idea implied a ‘deﬁcit model’ (Wynne 1991,
1992) of PUS which presumes that the public usually has a
considerable lack of knowledge on and understanding of
science and is in need of proper information in order to
make the adequate democratic decisions. Large-scale
quantitative surveys were carried out in order to measure
‘science literacy’ among the general public (Miller 1998)
and educational efforts were conceived to improve this
literacy.
Under the impression of results from the British Bodmer
Report (Royal Society 1985), the focus of PUS research
shifted from measuring and increasing public knowledge
about science to examining and inﬂuencing public attitudes
towards science (Bodmer 1987). Nevertheless, the under-
lying deﬁcit model still remained rather inﬂuential. Thus, it
was presumed that public ignorance about science leads to
irrational reservations and fears and therefore nurtures anti-
scientiﬁc or anti-technological attitudes (Sturgis and Allum
2004).
However, on the background of various technological
crises (e.g. Chernobyl, Sellaﬁeld, BSE) in the 1990s, the
normative assumptions on the relation of science and
society and the role and status of science and scientiﬁc
expertise implicit in the deﬁcit model were discussed
critically (Wynne 1993). In contrast to the preceding
survey research, qualitative methods and active engage-
ment and inclusion of the public were frequently recom-
mended as indispensable ways of re-establishing ‘‘trust’’
(Irwin 2006).
From an ethical point of view, this ‘participatory turn’ in
the social sciences and in policy appears particularly
interesting because it brings to bear a normative perspec-
tive (see also OWN REFERENCE 3, 227 f.): First of all, it
is a self-critical development in which expert roles and the
socio-political function of research (in science and
humanities) are reﬂected, questioned and criticized. Fur-
thermore, it is based on—often implicit—normative
assumptions about what the public is, at all, and why it
should be taken into account or engaged (Gerhards et al.
1998). Insofar as these assumptions are justiﬁed, they are
relevant for bioethical reasoning, as well. They can moti-
vate a normative interest in public views of, attitudes
towards and interactions with moral questions and prob-
lems in the context of biomedicine, e.g. concerning abor-
tion, in vitro-fertilization, allocation in health care, and
more recently, embryonic stem cells procurement and
research.
The public understanding of ethics
In analogy to the sociological interest in public perceptions
of science and technology (and the term ‘‘public’’ is often
used in a very broad meaning, here), the object of the
corresponding ethical interest could be described as
‘‘public understandings of ethics’’ (see Schweda and
Schicktanz 2010, p. 68). The concept includes public
concerns about scientiﬁc and technological developments,
but also comprises all other forms of argumentation, jus-
tiﬁcation and normative judgement, e.g. about why it is
morally problematic to use embryos in medical research or
to withhold genetic information, or how to respect a patient
in a clinical setting (e.g. Raz and Schicktanz 2009). In a
broader sense, the term could also be used to denominate
social research on public views of and attitudes towards the
role of ethics and ethicists in many social and political
contexts—a ﬁeld hardly investigated, so far.
But why should ‘‘public understandings of ethics’’ be of
any relevance at all for normative ethical reﬂection? After
all, there seems to be no direct way of deriving normative
conclusions from socio-empirical observations, of inferring
from what people believe to be morally right to what really
is right. In the course of the so called ‘‘empirical turn’’ in
applied ethics, these questions have been discussed inten-
sively and controversially (Borry et al. 2005; Birnbacher
1999). In general, this ‘‘empirical turn’’ refers to the
increasing number of quantitative surveys or qualitative
studies (e.g. interviews, direct observations) which collect
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ethicists on a certain bioethical topic. (To be perfectly
precise, it would even be better to label it socio-empirical
ethics, because in applied bioethics, also empirical facts
from natural sciences are integrated, but this is not the issue
of this paper). In the following sections, we will critically
discuss why ‘‘empirical ethics’’ itself has to reﬂect on
‘‘how’’ and with whom empirical research is done for
ethical argumentation (Schweda and Schicktanz 2010,
pp. 69–71). Basic normative convictions should lead to
methodological decisions that acknowledge that the
‘‘public’’ and ‘‘patients’’ can be of particular interest in
comparison to other opinion holders.
Importance of empirical information for applied ethics
Let us start with some general considerations about
empirical ethics. In general, many arguments in favour of
empirical ethics are methodological. They claim that the
epistemic quality of ethical theorizing improves by
including additional empirical information. Thus, socio-
empirical research can function as a trigger of ethical
reﬂection. It can point to remote or emerging moral prob-
lems (Levitt 2003). For example, the statistic ﬁnding that
there is a signiﬁcant gender imbalance in living organ
donation can give rise to moral concerns about justice and
exploitation between men and women which have not been
discussed in the ethics of organ transplantation, before
(Schicktanz et al. 2010). Furthermore, many applied ethical
arguments rely on certain socio-empirical assumptions.
Thus, so called ‘‘slippery slope’’ and ‘‘automatic escala-
tor’’-arguments (Holm and Takala 2007) are based on
premises about human behaviour and future social conse-
quences of actions. Empirical research can be employed to
examine and thus strengthen or criticize these premises.
Finally, empirical research can increase the context-sensi-
tivity of ethical reasoning by highlighting relevant frame-
work conditions and factors of concrete practical decisions
(Musschenga 2005). This is also important since most
normative theories involve the idea that considered
judgements and ethical orientations should eventually be
implemented in social reality, and the corresponding
approaches to moral education and implementation also
rely on empirical information (Birnbacher 1999).
Of course, these three lines of argument do not answer
the question whose opinion is of particular importance: Do
e.g. medical doctors have a better insight in what is a moral
problem in the clinical practise of health care rationing
than nurses? And do natural scientists have a more valid
opinion about what could be future risks of biotechnology
than social scientists? The ﬁrst intuitive answer might be
that it depends on the context of the questions to be
answered. But as we will show later, this is insufﬁcient. It
is particularly important to make sure that the opinions of
those who will be affected by the decisions in different
ways are sufﬁciently considered on the levels of problem
identiﬁcation, examination of empirical premises and
application of normative directives.
Normative justiﬁcation for taking lay moralities
into account
Besides these three general arguments in favour of inte-
grating empirical research into bioethical reﬂection, there
is also a more polarized controversy about empirical ethics.
This controversy deals with the role of socio-empirical
studies for the normative justiﬁcation of ethical principles
(Musschenga 2005). On this level, there is traditionally
serious scepticism about the relevance of empirical
research. The main line of critique is based on the natural
fallacy-argument and objects that it is logically incorrect to
derive normative judgements from empirical facts.
However, this criticism does not recognize that most of
the relevant contemporary ethical conceptions actually
already argue for the inclusion of the public in one way or
the other, as long as the ethical decision is not merely seen
as an individual one, but also has a public, social dimen-
sion. Thus, many prominent deontological and conse-
quentialistic approaches proceed from the idea that the
‘neutral or moral point of view’ is essentially characterized
by impartiality, that is, the fair consideration of all relevant
standpoints (Jollimore 2006). In this spirit, an interactive,
deliberative conception like Discourse Ethics combines a
general concept of rationality with the principle of being
affected, arguing that only those norms which could the-
oretically achieve the rational consent of all persons
affected can claim genuine legitimacy (Habermas 1990).
And an important consequentialistic position like Prefer-
ence Utilitarianism demands that the preferences of those
affected by decisions have to be considered (Singer 1979).
However, the ethical consideration of those who are
affected is often done in a rather schematic and abstract
way. On the other hand, other ethical approaches challenge
this idea and question whether schematic impartiality can
really do justice to all relevant positions. Thus, in common
sense-based, hermeneutic, pragmatist, and Aristotelian
approaches such as Communitarianism, common morality
and concrete public perspectives are usually seen as a
methodologically indispensable starting point and norma-
tive source for ethical reﬂection (Kuczewski 2009). And in
feminist and care ethics, the speciﬁc points of view and
relations of those involved in a concrete situation are par-
ticularly important and are defended against ethical rea-
soning based on abstract principles (Held 2005).
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dimension of ethical reasoning
As we have seen, contemporary ethics already provides
manifold normative arguments for including public per-
spectives in one way or the other. From an epistemological
point of view, however, it is arguable whether one single
person is really cognitively capable of impartially consid-
ering and weighing all relevant perspectives in a mono-
logical reﬂection: ‘‘Given the conception of the impartial
point of view as a ‘God’s eye’ point of view, …, it seems
questionable whether it is ever reasonable to expect a
human moral agent to be able to occupy such a perspec-
tive’’ (Jollimore 2006). This epistemological scepticism
seems particularly striking when it comes to bioethical
conﬂicts: Who could really claim—e.g. as a physically and
cognitively functioning person in a secure social setting—
to be able to put himself in the position of somebody who
has a different socio-cultural background, lives under
desolate social conditions, has another gender or is
chronically ill or disabled?
As we have argued earlier (Schicktanz et al. 2008,
pp. 60–62), the concept of ‘being affected’ plays a crucial,
but ambiguous role in this bioethical context: On the one
hand, it refers to an objective relation between a state of
affairs and a person (or a number of persons). For example,
one can be affected by radioactivity without regarding
oneself as an affected person or even taking notice of one’s
own affectedness. On the other hand, it can also be used to
denote a mostly negative emotional reaction that involves
feelings like dismay, concern and empathy with the suf-
fering of others. These are two reasons why patients and
their relatives can be classiﬁed as ‘affected persons’ in the
biomedical contexts—while taking into account that ‘being
affected’ depends on medico-technical classiﬁcations as
well as on epistemological categories. Many affected per-
sons claim to have exclusive insights which rest e.g. on a
speciﬁc embodied forms of experience such as suffering or
an individual patient history. In this context, ‘experience’
means a procedural subjective knowledge that combines
cognitive, emotional, moral and social dimensions. For our
purpose, these experiences should be communicable on an
inter-personal level. Of course, these epistemological
claims need consideration as being affected may not lead to
a superior perspective, but merely to a different one. But
without denying the effects of communication, compas-
sion, role reversal and mediated experience, there is a
strong plausibility that some particular experiences cannot
(sufﬁciently) be reconstructed from an external point of
view.
According to the philosopher and legal scholar Melissa
Williams, a fair and just public discourse needs at least
some direct representation of the voices of those who are
minorities or live in dependence because the majority
groups (here experts) do not share their particular history
and experience of being dominated, marginalized, or
excluded and are therefore likely to lack the ability of
understanding their speciﬁc situation and concerns (Wil-
liams 1998, p. 131). In the context of medicine, this
argument is very striking. Thus, patients share experiences
of asymmetries, pain, dependence, fears, and helplessness
which are often ethically relevant, but are not sufﬁciently
considered by doctors who want to work efﬁciently, suc-
cessfully and time saving.
All the above mentioned theories amount to a theoreti-
cal argument for transforming individual, subjective rea-
soning into an inter-subjective process which allows the
abstraction from own interests and experiences. As we
argue in the next section, these normative considerations
have methodological implications for ‘empirical ethics’: If
we accept that a (morally) legitimate decision has to be
based on the rational agreement of all affected persons or at
least has to take their views and attitudes into account, the
question is how bioethics can access these views and atti-
tudes practically.
The ethical implications of methodological questions
According to the previous argument, considering and
including peoples’ actual viewpoints and attitudes can help
to extend congruency between those who decide and those
who are affected by the decisions. Therefore, deliberative
and argumentative conceptions of directly including the
public, its views and attitudes, by means of socio-empirical
research and public participation are particularly important
for ethical reasoning. At the same time, the methodology of
including public views and attitudes shifts to the centre of
normative concern. There are at least three major problems
(Schweda and Schicktanz 2010, pp. 71 f.):
Identiﬁcation of those who are affected persons
Following the politico-ethical ideal of autonomy as self-
determination and self-development as an actively engaged
agent, those affected by a decision should have a say in the
decision making process. Therefore, the identiﬁcation of
informants and the composition of samples, that is, the
question of who should be included in the research design,
turn out to be issues of high normative relevance: Who
should take part in an interview, participate in a focus
group or attend a participatory setting? To answer these
questions, we have to decide whose voices should count in
a given situation and justify our decision (especially in
cases of limited research resources).
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needs critical reﬂection (Schicktanz et al. 2008, pp. 69 f.):
The (self-)ascription of ‘‘being affected’’ can involve sev-
eral factors, from types of knowledge to social roles and
moral ideals. Furthermore, there may be different ways of
‘‘being affected’’ which have to be assessed and weighed
differently, e.g. being directly or indirectly affected or
being actually, prospectively or potentially affected. Thus,
the criteria for ‘being affected’ have to be made explicit
and reﬂected in order to avoid bias on the basic level of the
composition of samples. In the case of organ transplanta-
tion, for example, there has been quite a lot of socio-
empirical research on public attitudes. However, most of
the studies simply seem to presume that only the patients
who are in need of an organ are ‘affected’: Their interests
and needs are often taken for granted and constitute the
implicit normative perspective in which the whole problem
is framed and discussed (e.g. as the problem of ‘‘organ
shortage’’). In this perspective, the general public is only
taken into consideration insofar as they are perceived as
potential donors whose morally problematic reluctance to
donate their organs has to be overcome, e.g. by campaigns
or ﬁnancial incentives. Their own viewpoints and interests
as persons potentially affected by organ donation often do
not receive a corresponding degree of attention—which is
ethically quite problematic. The direct inclusion of ‘‘lay
people’’ in focus group discussions has shown (Schweda
and Schicktanz 2009; Schicktanz and Schweda 2009) that
being addressed as a future deceased donor (or living
donor) constitutes an ethically highly loaded perspective.
The idea of being seen as a sort of public organ reservoir by
some doctors and patients in the case of brain-death lets
them question whether there is a fair and consistent justi-
ﬁcation, since—e.g. in respect to testaments—the personal
will retains strong social and legal binding force even
beyond their death.
Consequently, the selection of the public and/or patients
for empirical studies in bioethics needs particular attention
and justiﬁcation. The normative aim of this methodology is
to explore different voices and insights with moral rele-
vance (while sheer heterogeneity might not be a sufﬁcient
replacement for particular experience). To this end, current
discussions in political theory about the limits of liberal
representation can be made productive for bioethics.
Adopting the concept of political group representation as
defended by social philosophers such as Iris Young and
Melissa Williams (1998), the personal representation of
affected persons can be normatively justiﬁed. Thus, a fair
consideration of patients’ interests requires the inclusion of
their own voices rather than the ‘neutral’ representation of
their ‘interests’ by professionals and functionaries. Of
course, all selected voices have to be framed and inter-
preted with a critical eye on hegemonic public discourses,
especially insofar as they are inﬂuenced by the mass media
(e.g. Gerhards and Scha ¨fer 2009). The same holds true,
however, for any expert analysis and expert involvement
since media coverage about bioethical issues usually cor-
relates strongly with the expert discourse (see e.g. for the
German context: Grauman 2003).
Collection of public voices
In addition to the ‘who’, a second normative concern with
regard to the methodology is the ‘how’: How do we have to
collect, analyse and represent public perspectives and
attitudes in order to meet the ethical requirements? As far
as the level of data collection is concerned, quantitative
studies are widely seen as the ‘‘gold standard’’ for research
on public opinions. They are representative for the
respective population and claim objectivity and generaliz-
ability. In an ethical perspective, however, it seems that
qualitative, participatory and deliberative methods are at
least equally relevant insofar as we are interested in
reconstructing broader contexts and resources of ethical
argumentation in a highly differentiated form. After all,
ethical perspectives require interpretive work and cultiva-
tion of collective meanings. It is also an accepted principle
that differences of meaning and normative principle should
be respected. In addition, public perspectives and concerns
are usually multidimensional and complex, and often
articulated in an indirect manner, as well as being dynamic
and relational. All of these considerations lead to the
conclusion that qualitative methods are necessary, even if
not exclusively so. Indeed, a mixed methods approach
might be a helpful way out of the classical dichotomy
between quantitative and qualitative studies (see Ta-
shakkori and Taddlie 2003), also by promoting a critical
triangulation of premises and a reduction of methodologi-
cal bias.
However, both classical quantitative as well as qualita-
tive approaches are still often limited with regard to active
participation of lay people and patients in a deliberative
discourse. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss
the options and limits of deliberative democracy in general.
Here we focus on the role of the public within the academic
framework of bioethics when stressing the methodological,
normative and practical concerns. Of course, when it
comes to the more general political framework of bioeth-
ics, one can extend this position and argue for more
deliberative democratic structures in science policy. Thus,
the public and the affected persons should not only be
addressed as informants who respond to qualitative or
quantitative questionnaires, but also as active political
agents. From this point of view, deliberative approaches
such as citizen conferences or public hearings go a step
further in the claim for more direct representation: To
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framework of reasoned or at least narrative argumentative
debates (Burgess et al. 2007; Means 2002; Myshkja 2007).
This does not imply an exclusive practise of citizen con-
ferences etc. in the biopolitical ﬁeld, but could complement
the dominant practise of expert advice (for a more exten-
sive discussion of the pros and cons of applying partici-
patory elements in biopolitics, see e.g. Schicktanz 2008).
The inclusion of patients, representatives of patient or-
ganisations or members of disability groups into ethics
boards and committees would be a ﬁrst practical step in this
direction. Existing power imbalances cannot justify their
exclusion from the discussion, but rather point at the
necessity of exploring different (social scientiﬁc) methods
of empowering them to raise their own voices.
Here is not the space to discuss all advantages and
disadvantages of the different methods used in empirical
ethics. However, we want to stress that the choice of the
methods itself has to be justiﬁed not only with regard to
methodological standards in social science, but also in view
of underlying normative premises (e.g. reﬂection on power
(im-)balances, normative ideals of communication and
deliberation). We propose that an argumentative form of
data collection should be given special, albeit not exclusive
attention. The more elaborated the argumentative structure
of the represented attitudes and public perspectives is, the
more insights for ethical reasoning can be expected.
Interpretation of public attitudes and arguments
Finally, there is the question of which concepts and
approaches should be used to describe and analyse public
positions in an adequate way. Traditionally, social research
in this ﬁeld frames these issues in terms of ‘‘values’’, of
individual attitudes that are measured by means of opinion
surveys. For several reasons, this approach is not sufﬁcient
in view of the abovementioned ethical purposes. First, it
usually serves a descriptive interest while the perspective
of the ethically motivated approach is a normative one: Not
only the propositional, statistical occurrence and correlates
of attitudes are relevant, but also their normative content,
weight and legitimacy. In this respect, sociological
research surveying ‘‘values’’ is much too undifferentiated
to be useful as a normative vocabulary for ethical debates.
It often lacks ideational and argumentative context and
ignores the signiﬁcance of collective, cultural forms
(Means 2002). Broader resources of moral reasoning have
to be taken into account in order to assess moral claims
from a normative point of view.
Thus, especially in the context of a deﬁcit model of
PUS, with its attendant problematic normative impositions
(Wynne 2006), quantitative research can unfold the
dynamic of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy: Public positions are
made to look irrational by analytical concepts and methods
which separate them from their multidimensional socio-
cultural contexts, their concrete ideational and motivational
backgrounds, and their rich argumentative resources,
reducing them to isolated ‘‘opinions’’ or ‘‘values’’, instead.
Qualitative research and especially deliberative and par-
ticipatory approaches can give a ﬁner grained picture of
ethical arguments and their ideational and motivational
resources. Therefore, they are important instruments for
detecting misrepre sentations of public views and interests.
Additionally, they allow a critique of the instrumentaliza-
tion of quantitative statistical ﬁndings. It is not so much
that these are false, but that such methods, more powerful
in some limited respects, can only exercise that extra sta-
tistical power correctly on simple responses to simple
questions. E.g. it is often stated that many public surveys
show peoples’ high acceptance of organ donation which is
used as an argument for introducing presumed consent
solutions. However, the number of those who actually have
a donor card is much lower. Obviously, the survey data
does neither sufﬁciently explore the difference between
general attitudes and contextualised decisions nor explain
irritations, misunderstandings, and resistance.
Conclusions
In the light of our considerations, taking the public
understanding of ethical issues into account for discussion
on bioethical questions is not just the ‘‘cherry on the cake,’’
as if some pleasant and prestigious, but ultimately dis-
pensable add-on. The implementation and further devel-
opment of inclusive and reasonable forms of public
exchange constitute a central bioethical concern. This is
particularly true when bioethics is seen as an area that
spans from theoretical considerations and academic
teaching to policy advice and even biopolitics. Especially
when the concept of ethical expertise and its role in dem-
ocratic policies is connected to the idea of strong justiﬁ-
cation (Weinstein 1994), ethical reasoning has to face the
challenge and stand the test posed by the actual diversity
of—affected, situated and embodied—standpoints, per-
spectives, interests, and meanings. A bioethical position
that fails to do this, and which thus avoids the confronta-
tion with different public arguments, including ones per-
haps based in different cultural histories, relations and
ontological grounds (Benhabib 1996; Williams 1998), not
only runs the risk of missing important aspects, ideas and
arguments. It also arouses strong suspicion of being indeed
one-sided, biased or ideological—thus illegitimate. Insofar,
recent polemics against the ‘‘ethics industry’’ (see above)
have to be taken seriously as an expression of criticism as
far as uncritical and poorly founded ‘‘expert-centrism’’ and
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still exists. By including the public more explicitly into its
methods and considerations—which does not at all mean a
romantic uncritical subservience to any public view—,
bioethics could avoid the ‘‘tragic choice’’ (Scoﬁeld 2008)
between democracy and expertise and be more than just
part of an obscure ‘‘ethics industry’’: A constructive ele-
ment of a dynamically learning, modern, liberal and
democratic policy in the ﬁelds of biomedicine and bio-
technology. A ﬁrst step in this direction would be to pursue
systematically the ‘‘empirical turn’’ in academic bioethics
in order to level out power imbalances implied in many
applied bioethical theories. By focussing on voices, expe-
riences and positions of those that have previously been
excluded from, under- or misrepresented in the established
expert discourse, we can explore how, where and when
patient representatives are missing in ethics committees
and national ethics councils.
Against this background, the relevance of the current
debate about ‘‘empirical ethics’’ can be revalidated
(Schicktanz 2009). This debate is more than just another
esoteric methodological controversy. Much more is at stake
than the ‘is-ought gap’ or the professional identity of an
academic discipline. The ‘empirical turn’ is not a threat to a
pure academic rationality, but rather a way to increase the
reasonableness and legitimacy of ethical considerations by
expanding the forum—the agora, as Nowotny et al. (2001)
put it—in which they have to demonstrate their persuasive
power. This is expansion not only in political constituency,
but in ethical and political, as well as intellectual quality.
At the same time, methodological debates of social
research and participatory tools gain a crucial normative
relevance and turn methodological questions into ethical
concerns: The sociological examination of public attitudes
towards science and ethics is in need of ethics, itself. This
marks a new area of collaboration between social science
scholars and ethicists.
All in all, the participatory turn has had quite impressive
success: In the meantime, the role of participation has
become so prominent in several countries, for example in
the UK, that critical authors indeed speak of a ,,tyranny of
participation’’ (Cooke and Kothari 2001). Against the
background of our considerations, however, it is not so
much the question of whether, but rather of how—in which
spirit and with which methods—the public should be
included. Of course, the inclusion of the public does not
necessarily have to rely on direct participation. Depending
on the respective purposes and framework conditions, it
can also be implemented by means of representative
mechanisms including forms of expert- and (partly new)
media discourses. More important is that inclusion should
strive for a deliberative, argumentative structure permitting
and supporting richer argumentative exchange, and inter-
pretations which include institutional self-reﬂection.
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